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An Economics Perspective on Financial Reporting Objectives 
 
Summary at a Glance 
 
The paper examines IASB and FASB’s stated objectives of financial reporting, and in 
particular the decision to disregard the motivational aspects of stewardship information. The 
paper shows this view to be flawed from a theoretical perspective and considers the practical 
consequences. 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines the decision of IASB and FASB to subsume stewardship within the sole 
financial reporting objective of informing investment decisions rather than seeing it as 
separate and distinct. This view is shown to be flawed from a theoretical economics 
perspective given the differences in the underlying properties of accounting information. In 
answer to the question of what difference the boards’ policy would make, the paper outlines 
consequences in relation to accounting standard-setting and contracting with managers. 
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An Economics Perspective on Financial Reporting Objectives 
 
In 2010, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) published Chapters 1 and 3 of a revised Conceptual Framework 
(CF), also known in the U.S. as Concepts Statement #8. These pronouncements still stand 
notwithstanding that the IASB is in the process of issuing its own CF, which has reached the 
exposure draft stage. There are no plans currently in the U.S. to revise Concepts Statement 
#8. One of the most controversial aspects of Chapter 1 of the 2010 version is the omission of 
stewardship as a distinct objective of financial reporting. According to this view, the sole 
purpose of financial reports is to provide forward-looking information to facilitate investment 
decision-making, focusing on future payoffs, and characteristics such as risk (FASB 2010, 
OB2, OB3). Although the IASB has subsequently modified its position regarding stewardship 
to the extent that the ED now refers to the concept several times explicitly by name, the board 
continues to see stewardship as part of the process of facilitating investment decisions (IASB 
2015a, 1.2). The Basis for Conclusions document that accompanied the ED summarises the 
current position: 
 
For the following reasons, the IASB rejected the idea of identifying the provision of 
information to help assess management’s stewardship as an additional, and equally 
prominent, objective of financial reporting: 
 
(a) information about management’s stewardship is part of the information used to 
make decisions about whether to buy, sell or hold an investment … 
 
(b) introducing an additional primary objective of financial reporting could be 
confusing. (IASB 2015b, BC1.10). 
 
 
The decision in 2010 to treat stewardship in this way was taken in the face of 
significant opposition (PAAinE 2007; AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee 
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2007; Kothari et al. 2010; Lambert 2010; Walker 2010; Pelger 2016), and still remains 
contentious. Proponents of stewardship as a distinct objective of financial reporting failed to 
convince FASB members especially that a stewardship perspective would make any 
difference in practice (Zeff 2013; Pelger 2016).  
This paper considers whether this view is valid. It approaches the problem from an 
economics angle and therefore compliments the work of other authors who have examined 
the issue from a non-economics perspective and drawn similar conclusions (Bayou et al. 
2011; Murphy et al. 2013; Williams and Ravenscroft 2015). An information-economics 
viewpoint is particularly helpful given that the IASB and FASB frame their CFs in a similar 
language, referring to the qualitative characteristics of information and the costs/benefits of 
providing it. Essentially, the paper makes two points: Disregarding the motivational aspects 
of stewardship information is theoretically unsound. Also, there are ramifications for 
practitioners concerning future standard-setting and the contractual arrangements with 
managers. The paper continues by examining the theoretical position before moving on to the 
practical implications. 
 
Two Valuable Characteristics of Information 
 
One of the difficulties faced by IASB/FASB in distinguishing the stewardship objective from 
the decision-usefulness one is that stewardship can be perceived as lacking ‘an autonomous 
rationality’, due in part to the fact that stewardship information about the past can indeed be 
useful to investors in assessing future cash flows (Pelger 2016, p. 61). However, this does not 
imply that stewardship information cannot be distinguished from information for investment 
decision-making, or that it does not serve a separate and crucial purpose.  
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Borrowing from economic theory, information can be regarded as an economic 
product or service. Lancaster (1966a; 1966b) models the demand for products and services in 
terms of consumer preferences for the underlying characteristics of products. For example, 
food products supply a ‘bundle’ of nutrients, additives and energy levels, and consumers are 
presumed to have demands for products depending on the ‘bundle’ of underlying 
characteristics each one offers. Similarly, a model of car offers a number of characteristics of 
value to consumers, such as style, engine performance, fuel economy, levels of pollutants, 
and so on, which distinguish the vehicles. The same argument applies to information. 
According to economic theory, accounting information possesses two fundamental 
characteristics. First, it will assist users in making decisions that are contingent on 
information signals, which is the role privileged by IASB/FASB. Also, it will be useful in 
situations where the interests of economic agents are in conflict and there is uncertainty about 
how they will act. Information can then be used to align those interests through the provision 
of incentives based on outcome data (Ijiri 1983; Ball 1989; Christensen and Feltham 2008), 
which is the aspect of stewardship that two boards disregard.1 Following the food and car 
analogy, any given piece of information may possess either or both of these characteristics in 
varying amounts, but this does not mean that they do not perform different functions or that it 
would be reasonable to model user-demand on the one attribute alone. 
Focusing on the underlying characteristics of information shows what is and what is 
not distinct. Information with the decision-usefulness characteristic acts on decision-makers’ 
beliefs, while information designed to influence agents’ behaviour mitigates incentive 
problems. The latter need not affect beliefs about investment opportunities in any way. 
Nevertheless, it has value in deterring undesirable behaviour.  
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Qualitative Characteristics  
Turning now to the CF specifically, FASB/IASB identify relevance, timeliness and 
verifiability as properties of valuable information, alongside faithful representation, 
comparability, and understandability (FASB 2010, BC1.23, QC4). Comparing these 
pronouncements to the results from the economic theory of accounting, relevance and timing 
are the most important determinants of whether information is valuable from a decision-
maker’s perspective (Feltham 1972; Ijiri and Itami 1973). Conversely, relevance and timing 
are less important as far as influencing an agent’s behaviour is concerned, while verifiability 
assumes greater significance (Ijiri 1971; Gjesdal 1981).  
Relevance means the potential of information to alter a decision. This is clearly 
necessary for decision-useful information to have value. Timeliness is also paramount. If the 
information is received too late, it loses its potential to affect decisions and therefore ceases 
to be relevant.2 This is not the case for stewardship information which can be produced 
retrospectively and still retain its value through the incentive effects produced. In this 
scenario, agents take better decisions not because they have better information but because 
they are motivated by the prospect of future performance evaluation.  
Verifiability, for its part, is of major significance in influencing agents’ behaviour 
because verifiable information makes for a more effective contracting variable in the design 
of agent rewards. Because the information on agents’ performance can be verified, contracts 
can be enforced by a court of law. Without verifiability, contracts become unenforceable in 
law, which weakens the incentive properties of the accounting information provided (Ijiri, 
1971; Arrow 1983; Laffont and Martimort 2002: Ch 6).  
In summary, the underlying properties of the two information types are different. 
They each perform distinctive functions in the technology of financial reporting. The focus of 
incentive based stewardship information is on linking the reward of managers to measures of 
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past performance, whereas for decision-useful information, it is on predicting future 
outcomes. For these reasons, these two valuable characteristics of accounting information 
cannot be regarded conceptually as one. 
 
Practical Implications 
 
The conceptual distinction between decision-usefulness and incentive based stewardship 
information would be unimportant if there were little demand for the latter or the practical 
consequences of dispensing with it were insignificant. This is not the case. 
Turning first to the question of the volume of demand for stewardship information to 
control managerial behaviour, problems of agency and asymmetric information are arguably 
self-evident given the contemporary international focus on corporate governance structures 
following the Cadbury Report (1992). Accounting scandals occur with regularity despite 
monitoring from boards of directors, shareholders and debtholders (e.g. Burrough and Helyar 
1990; Clarke et al. 2003; Tirole 2006, Ch. 1; Fallon and Cooper 2015). Lee (2006 p. 421) 
portrays the situation as an undeclared war between the protectors of the public interest and 
those corporate managers who regard the information in financial reports as their private 
domain. Such behaviour is not in the interests of the capital providers, the class of account-
users prioritised in the CF, who risk financial losses. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some 86% of 
respondents to IASB/FASB during the consultation phase leading to the publication of 
Chapters 1 and 3 in 2010 opposed the plan to encompass stewardship within decision-
usefulness rather than seeing it as an independent aim (Pelger 2016).  
If the demand by users for stewardship information to incentivise managers appears 
not to be in doubt, the question remains what difference omitting it would make in practice. 
Accounting standard-setting and contracting with managers are two of the areas likely to be 
affected.  
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Standard-setting 
Quite reasonably, IASB/FASB set out a cost-benefit test, referred to as the ‘cost constraint’, 
to be used when developing future accounting standards; i.e.) that the costs of reporting 
financial information should be justified by the benefits (FASB 2010, QC35). However, there 
are two difficulties associated with this approach as it is currently configured. First, the 
boards ignore the impact of alternative information sources in their assessment of benefits; 
and second, they ignore incentive problems within corporations. Both omissions are likely to 
lead to the cost-benefit test being incorrectly applied to decisions over accounting disclosures 
in future accounting standards.  
Alternative and more-timely public information sources include forecasts by company 
officials, dividend announcements, information concerning financing arrangements, real 
investment, labour and board management issues, and government or regulatory decisions, all 
of which act as signals of profitability, risk or investment quality (Waymire 1984; Dielman 
and Oppenheimer 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). Hence, the decision-usefulness of accounts 
is reduced to the extent that either the disclosures are already in the public domain or are fully 
reflected in the prices of securities. Although IASB/FASB acknowledge the need for 
investors to seek information beyond the accounts (FASB 2010, OB6), they give no 
consideration to the interactions between the various sources. According to information 
economics, however, such interactions will inevitably affect the value of accounting 
disclosures.3 
Ignoring incentive problems compounds the mismatch of costs and benefits, not 
simply from a stewardship point of view, but from a decision-usefulness perspective as well. 
Decision-useful information provided to external parties of a company is a communication of 
information held by the corporation’s agents. Such information may well allow an external 
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decision-maker to take better decisions, but it has also been shown to create agency problems 
where managers have access to the information that companies communicate (Christensen, 
1981). 
 
Contracting with Managers 
As noted above, the verifiability of accounting information takes on a much more significant 
role under stewardship than investment decision-making because it makes for a more 
effective contracting variable in the design of agent rewards. Without verifiability, a contract 
becomes unenforceable in law, and this possibility will weaken the incentive properties of the 
information (Arrow 1983; Laffont and Martimort 2002: Ch 6). The importance of 
verifiability in influencing managers’ behaviour through contracting suggests that it should 
be given higher priority in the CF than its current status as a secondary enhancing property of 
information (FASB, 2010, BC1.23, QC4; IASB, 2015a, 2.22).  
In fact, IASB go as far as suggesting that an acceptable alternative to providing 
measurements that are capable of verification might be to require ‘disclosures that enable the 
users of financial statements to understand the assumptions used’ (IASB 2015a, 6.61).4 Such 
an approach may be necessary in trying to capture the future cash inflows and outflows 
arising from certain types of asset and liability that are hard to measure, intangibles being one 
example. The balance sheet approach, which measures income as the increase in net 
assets/economic resources over a period, is the chosen method of IASB/FASB for promoting 
the decision-usefulness objective in financial statements.5 But for this to work properly, 
companies must be able to value all their assets and liabilities, which introduces the added 
uncertainty of predicting the future. The danger for contracting is that the current shift in 
emphasis ‘from financial reports providing verifiable backward-looking data to providing 
more valuation-relevant fair-value estimates is likely to lower the explicit use of accounting 
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numbers in contracting, which traditionally has been an important role for accounting’ 
(Shivakumar 2013, p. 379). Hence, in cases where non-verifiable information has decision-
usefulness, it will seldom be used to hold agents to account.6 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
The paper has examined the decision of IASB and FASB to treat stewardship as part of the 
decision-usefulness objective of financial reporting rather than seeing it as separate and 
distinct. This view has been shown to be flawed from a theoretical economics perspective 
given the differences in the underlying properties of accounting information. In answer to the 
question of what difference not recognising the incentive properties of stewardship 
information would make, the paper has outlined consequences in relation to the cost-benefit 
test applied in accounting standard-setting, and contracts linking managerial rewards to 
verifiable outcomes. 
The argument is not that the stewardship objective is more important than the 
decision-usefulness one, but that both characteristics of information are valuable, and that 
both should be recognised in the CF. Reconciling the two in the one financial report is not an 
easy task given their differences. Previous attempts to do so have contributed to what Lee 
(2006, p. 421) describes as the ‘subjective, flexible, and inconsistent’ nature of financial 
reporting, resulting in ‘accounting numbers with ambiguous economic meaning’. However, 
ignoring the incentive properties of stewardship information is not the answer.7  
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1 See Feltham (1972), Demski (1980), Strong and Walker (1989), Laffont and Martimort (2002), Christensen 
and Demski (2003), Christensen and Feltham (2003), and Christensen and Feltham (2008) for elaboration on 
these two characteristics of accounting information. 
 
2 Faithful representation has no obvious analogue in the information-economics literature, while comparability 
and understandability are absent due to the assumption of rationality and a focus on the gross value of costless 
information. 
 
3 There is a wealth of evidence to support this conclusion: e.g.) Ball and Brown (1968); Brown (1970); Ball 
(1972); Brown and Kennelly (1972); Foster (1973, 1975); Arnold and Moizer (1984); Emanuel (1984); Bernard 
and Ruland (1987); Kothari (2001); Elwin (2013). 
 
4 Craig et al. (2017) criticise the ED for countenancing the inclusion of estimates that are not auditable by virtue 
of the uncertainties.  
 
5 See Kvif (2008) for a crtiticism. 
 
6 See Feltham and Wu (2000) for an illustration of this concerning the use in contracting of stock price as a 
proxy for the effects of unverifiable information acquired privately by investors.  
 
7 An alternative way forward that was tried in the 1970s in relation to current cost accounting, might be for 
accounts to contain dual representations of the same economic events (Abdel-Khalik 2010). 
                                                 
